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ABSTRACT: This article explores the role of weakness of will (akrasia) in the Indian 
Buddhist tradition, and in particular within Śāntideva’s Introduction to the Practice of 
Awakening (Bodhicaryāvatāra). In agreement with Jay Garfield, I argue that there are 
important differences between Aristotle’s account of akrasia and Buddhist moral psychology. 
Nevertheless, taking a more expanded conception of weakness of will, as is frequently done in 
contemporary work, allows us to draw significant connections with the pluralistic account of 
psychological conflict found in Buddhist texts. I demonstrate this by showing how Amélie 
Rorty’s expanded treatment of akrasia as including emotional response and perceptual 
classification allows us to recognize that one of the purposes of many of Śāntideva’s 
meditations is to treat various forms of akratic response. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In his Guide to the Practice of Awakening (Bodhicaryāvatāra; Hereafter BCA), the 
eighth century Indian Buddhist monk Śāntideva repeatedly urges himself to cease 
indulging in vice (pāpa) and creating the conditions for future suffering.1 It is no 
surprise, therefore, that Tom Tillemans has claimed that akrasia, or weakness of will, 
in which I voluntarily act against my better judgment, is a deep theme running 
through Śāntideva’s text (Tillemans 2008). In broad outline, comparisons of Indian 
Buddhist texts with ancient and contemporary treatments of weakness of will should 
seem promising. A significant goal of Buddhist moral psychology is to transform an 
aspirant’s depraved saṃsāric mind into one that is tranquil and devoid of conflict.  
The halfway point of akrasia, in which the agent struggles between the conflicting  
forces of virtue and vice, should provide fertile ground for cross-cultural analysis.			
__________________________ 
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1 Nowhere is he more explicit about this than BCA 4: 26-27. I return to these passages below.   
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Nevertheless, focusing on the details of this sketch may make us at least question how 
profitable a connection can be drawn. In a reply to Tillemans, Jay Garfield claims that 
Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia presupposes a particular understanding of the tension 
between reason and desire that is not shared by Buddhist authors (Garfield 2010, 
337).2 
 Garfield is right to stress disanalogies between Aristotle’s account of akrasia and 
Buddhist moral psychology, and I explore these differences in my first section. In the 
second, I show how Garfield’s concern can be addressed by broadening our focus 
beyond Aristotle’s conception of akrasia as a tension between reason and desire, and 
adopting instead the common contemporary definition of weakness of will as any 
kind of voluntary action or response against one’s better judgment.3 Both Aristotle 
and contemporary authors also discuss akrasia alongside closely related forms of 
psychological conflict such as being overcome by powerful emotion. I will also argue 
that broadening our focus to include some of these phenomena allows us to draw 
deeper connections between this work and Buddhist moral psychology.    
  The second section also explains why we should expect forms of psychological 
weakness, including akrasia, to be a prominent theme in Buddhist moral philosophy.4  
Here I show how akratic response is an almost inevitable byproduct of Buddhist 
moral development which emphasizes, among other things, intellectual awareness of 
Buddhist truths and greater control over one’s mental responses. In the final section I 
turn to Śāntideva’s BCA and explore both his explicit treatment of weakness of will, 
as well as a series of meditations, part of whose purpose is to prevent akratic 
response. Here, I draw upon Amélie Rorty’s expanded conception of akrasia, as 
including emotional reactions and perceptual classification, in order to identify the 
various kinds of psychological tensions that Śāntideva’s meditations address.   
                                                
2 Garfield’s other objection against Tillemans’ emphasis on akrasia is that Śāntideva’s text is better 
understood as a guide to radically reconstituting our experience of the world. Garfield characterizes 
this as a phenomenological reading of Śāntideva’s text, and contrasts it to other approaches such as 
Goodman’s (2008) consequentialism and Keown’s (2005) analysis of Buddhism as a virtue ethics. See 
especially Garfield (2010, 334-337). As will become clear, although I emphasis the importance of 
weakness of will as a theme within Śāntideva’s thought, I do not see this analysis as incompatible with 
any of the approaches Garfield refers to, including his emphasis on phenomenological reorientation. In 
the third section of this essay, I draw on Amélie Rorty’s  expanded analysis of akratic response to 
argue that perceptual experience, in some cases, can be akratic—that is both voluntary and in contrast 
to our better judgment. This kind of akratic response would, I think, play an important role in 
Garfield’s phenomenological account, which emphasizes the desirability of radically altering how we 
perceive the world.   
3 Tillemans also refers to the contemporary authors Donald Davidson and David Wiggins in his article 
(Tillemans 2008, 152), but his analysis does focus mainly on the tension between reason and desire.     
4  My use of the phrase “Buddhist moral philosophy” in this essay is not intended to imply any 
particular interpretation of Buddhism as an ethical system, such as consequentialism, deontology and 
so forth. I merely mean that Buddhists like Śāntideva often pay explicit attention to ethical questions 
such as how I should live, what constitutes a virtuous character and so on. Likewise, “moral 
psychology” merely indicates that much of Śāntideva’s thought focuses on considerations of mind and 
mental factors that relate to ethical questions such as how I should live; it is not meant to suggest a 
naturalized reading of Śāntideva’s text.  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I clarify my 
use of this oftentimes controversial terminology.   
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 Although I limit my focus in this essay to weakness of will and psychological 
conflict in Śāntideva’s BCA, it is important to keep in mind how these themes 
contribute to the text’s overall development. Śāntideva wrote the BCA as a guide for 
developing the virtuous qualities of the bodhisattva, the saint of Mahayana Buddhism 
who delays liberation from saṃsāra to work tirelessly for the sake of all sentient 
beings (BCA 1:1). The text’s primary purpose, then, is soteriological, focusing on the 
perfection of the moral character of an individual so that she is able to liberate herself 
and others from suffering. This process of moral growth takes place largely through 
the development of the bodhisattva’s virtues, and in particular that of the six 
perfections (pāramitās) of generosity (dāna), ethical discipline (śīla), patience 
(kṣānti), effort (vīrya), concentration (dhyāna)  and wisdom (prajñā). The BCA’s 
soteriological strategy, then, incorporates both philosophical and psychological 
elements, including an influential articulation of the virtues constituting enlightened 
character. My purpose here is to emphasize another of its philosophic aspects: the 
attention that Śāntideva pays to overcoming weakness of will, and other closely 
related forms of psychological tension. Conquering weakness of will constitutes a 
lessening of suffering in itself and is also a prerequisite for consistent dedication to 
the training that prepares the bodhisattva to work effectively for the benefit of all.5 
 
2. WEAKNESS OF WILL 
 
Ancient and contemporary authors have used the terms “weakness of will” and 
“akrasia” in a variety of different ways. I use them interchangeably in this essay.  We 
can characterize the general phenomena these discussions focus on as voluntary 
action against one’s better judgment. This basic account of akrasia includes two 
required elements. First, there is a simultaneous intellectual component, where one 
judges that the response being taken is not the preferred option. If I am unaware at the 
moment of acting that my response is not for the best, the response is not akratic, 
although it may be a closely related phenomenon such as self-deception. Second, the 
                                                
5 One of the difficulties of working with the BCA is the likelihood that certain portions of the text are 
intended for audiences of a specific level of moral development. For instance, much of the text 
encourages the reader to engage in the bodhisattva path for one’s own benefit, and even the 
development of the bodhisattva’s virtues is often linked to the removal of one’s own suffering. See for 
instance BCA 1:19-23, 6:9-10, 7:30 and 8:129. The verses which focus on one’s own well-being 
include several at the beginning of chapter four which below I argue constitute one of Śāntideva’s 
clearest treatments of weakness of will.  Much of this material is very much in the spirit of early 
Buddhist texts that emphasize practices to liberate an individual from her own suffering.  In apparent 
contrast, much of chapters eight and nine focus on themes stressed more heavily in Mahayana texts, 
and often in particular in Madhyamaka philosophy, including compassion for others and the emptiness 
of all phenomena. My strategy in this essay will be to explore what I take to be Śāntideva’s strongest 
contributions to debates about weakness of will, and this will require focusing mainly on the early 
portions of the text that often emphasize benefits to oneself. For reasons of space, I will have to bracket 
questions of how these passages relate to later portions of the text.  Thanks for an anonymous reviewer 
for suggesting I explicitly address this issue.   
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akratic response must be voluntary.6 I reserve the term and phrase “akrasia” and 
“weakness of will” for actions that fulfill both criteria. 
 Within this general characterization of akrasia, we can distinguish a number of 
sub-varieties. Aristotle claims the judgment in question must be correct, and limits 
what he considers real akrasia to conflicts between the intellect and the desire for 
pleasure; acting in anger against my (correct) better judgment is akrasia only in a 
secondary sense (Aristotle 2011, 139). Contemporary treatments of akrasia tend to 
broaden their accounts beyond Aristotle’s constrains, even while maintaining both 
elements listed above. For instance, Davidson drops Aristotle’s success condition, so 
that action against my better judgment constitutes akrasia, whether or not that 
judgment is correct (Davidson 2001, 21). Both Aristotle and contemporary authors 
generally limit their attention to akratic action; however, Amélie Rorty, in an 
influential article, broadens her focus to include emotional response and perceptual 
classification, which, when voluntary, can also constitute varieties of akratic response 
(Rorty 1980). I argue in the next section that this broadening trend brings 
contemporary work on weakness of will closer to the pluralistic account of 
psychological conflict found in Buddhist texts. I will not be developing my own 
account of akrasia in this essay; rather my purpose is to highlight how connections 
can profitably be drawn between Śāntideva’s consideration of psychological conflict 
and certain contemporary treatments of weakness of will.   
 Aristotle and contemporary authors also distinguish a number of psychological 
phenomena that resemble akrasia, but do not meet both of the criteria of akratic 
response. Giving up the simultaneity of judgment component results in varieties of 
distraction or self-deception. If I believe in the moment of action that my response is 
for the best, then the action is not a case of akrasia, even if before and immediately 
after the action I believe otherwise. Likewise, if I give up the voluntary element, I 
have cases in which I am forced to act against my better judgment. Hare offers the 
example of Medea who (in his interpretation) is literally overpowered by her 
emotions, and is therefore forced to murder her children (Hare 1963, 78-9). Finally 
we can distinguish akrasia from Horton’s account of irresoluteness, in which one 
inappropriately abandons one’s intentions (Horton 1999).7 Such failure may or may 
not be akratic, depending on whether it is accompanied by a simultaneous intellectual 
judgment that giving up one’s intention is not for the best (McIntyre 2006, 291-292).  
Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of psychological states with some relation to 
akrasia, but all of these forms of psychological weakness are of interest to Buddhist 
                                                
6  I am influenced by Sara Stroud (2014) in this section, although I do not always follow her 
presentation.   
7 Horton (1999) argues that the phrase “weakness of will” should be reserved for inappropriate revision 
of one’s intentions. I adopt the frequent convention of using “akrasia” and “weakness of will” 
synonymously, however, as a way of emphasizing continuity between ancient and contemporary 
discussions about deliberately acting against one’s better judgment. Unlike many cases of self-
deception or being overcome by emotion, failure to act on one’s intention will seldom be confused 
with akrasia, but I list it here since it is a type of psychological weakness that is of interest to Buddhist 
authors.  
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authors, since like akrasia they can represent instances in which a practitioner 
deviates from Buddhist practices. 
 In contrast to these closely related forms of psychological weakness, akrasia has 
been a particularly puzzling phenomenon for Plato, Aristotle and many contemporary 
authors. This is because they accept a strong connection between judgment and 
motivation, so that if one really believes an action to be for the best it is puzzling why 
one would not do it. 8  The puzzle disappears, however, in the related cases of 
psychological weakness referred to above. If I deceive myself into thinking my action 
is for the best, I am no longer acting against my better judgment, and likewise, if I am 
literally overpowered by emotion, there is no mystery why I act as I do, even if I 
intellectually understand it is not the best option.9    
 Significantly, however, Buddhist authors will not share this intellectual 
puzzlement over why or how I can freely act against my better judgment. This is 
because within Buddhist psychology, propositional knowledge of itself seldom 
indicates a deep enough insight into reality to provide significant motivational power. 
It is only direct nonconceptual understanding of the Four Noble Truths and so on that 
removes the deepest of the negative mental factors (kleśas) like anger and greed that 
greatly influence action.10 For instance, Buddhists distinguish the intellectual belief 
that the self exists (satkāyadṛṣṭi) from the deeply engrained spontaneous tendency to 
reify momentary and fragmentary experience into a unified enduring subject 
interacting with enduring objects.11 As long as these processes of reification continue, 
negative mental states will arise that have as much or more influence as intellectual 
knowledge over how I act. There is, then, no particular mystery within Buddhist 
psychology about why we often act against our better judgment, at least as long as our 
understanding remains at an intellectual level.12   
                                                
8  This leads Plato to deny the existence of akrasia. See Plato, Protagoras 352a-358c. Arguably, 
Aristotle does this as well at Nicomachean Ethics 1147b  (2011, 142).   
9 My discussion in this paragraph is indebted to Stroud (2014).  
10  Garfield makes a related point in arguing that for Śāntideva, vice is always accompanied by 
intellectual confusion (2010, 337-338). This does not rule out akratic action, however, since in 
Buddhist psychology deeply engrained intellectual confusion is compatible with making a 
simultaneous higher level intellectual judgment that a particular response is not for the best.   
11 Buddhist texts refer to these processes as I-making (ahamkāra) and mine-making (mamakāra). See 
Hamilton (2001, especially 55-60).     
12In apparent contrast to my claim, Tillemans stresses Śāntideva’s deep puzzlement over why he acts 
against his better judgment (2008, 154). In part, I think the passages Tillemans has in mind are better 
understood as expressions of Śāntideva’s frustration, rather than theoretical curiosity over why akratic 
action occurs. Tillemans is right, however, in stressing the lack of intelligibility, in terms of good 
reasons for actions, for Śāntideva’s, and indeed all akratic responses. My suggestion here is, I think, 
compatible with Tillemans’ own analysis of Buddhist akrasia as explicable in terms of 
compartmentalized of “cognitive sub-systems” (160), some of which are dominated by forms of deeply 
rooted ignorance that falsely take the worse option as the better.  What deserves emphasis in addition is 
that some of these subsystems occur at a deeper cognitive level than ordinary intellectual knowledge.  
For the Buddhist, then, my intellectual understanding of the good can be dominated by this deeper 
level of deluded conceptuality, and therefore have little motivational power.   
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  Unlike Western philosophers, therefore, Buddhist authors will not see the 
possibility of akrasia as a theoretical problem to be solved, but rather will view 
weakness of will as a practical problem to be overcome. Moreover, the problem 
overlaps considerably with the other kinds of psychological weakness identified 
above. Meditational treatments of these various psychological states will overlap as 
well; fear towards rebirth in a hell realm for instance will help the practitioner to both 
overcome akratic resistance to practicing virtue, as well as gain the required amount 
of control to withstand a formerly irresistible harmful emotional response.13 What this 
suggests is that unlike Western authors, Buddhist ethicists will not be concerned 
about distinguishing akrasia from closely related forms of psychological weakness 
like self-deception and being overcome by emotion.14 All such cases for the Buddhist 
are instances in which I veer away from virtue (kuśala) towards vice (pāpa/akuśala) 
which binds me to future suffering and rebirth. In the third section, I will illustrate 
this by showing how some of Śāntideva’s meditations can be seen as addressing 
akratic as well as non-akratic forms of psychological weakness.   
 
3. CONFLICT AND AKRASIA IN BUDDHIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Although there are pluralities of ways Buddhist ethical texts can be analyzed, perhaps 
the most general is to see them as theorizing how suffering (duḥkha) can be 
overcome. Other items in the Buddhist moral vocabulary are usually defined in terms 
of, or acquire their significance in relation to suffering and its ending. The virtuous 
mental states (kuśala-dharma) for instance are those that are conducive to ending 
suffering, while the Four Noble Truths illustrate how suffering arises and is 
eliminated. Focusing on the Buddhist analysis of suffering will also let us locate the 
role of akrasia and related forms of psychological weakness within Buddhist moral 
philosophy.   
One of the most distinctive aspects of Buddhist ethics is the extraordinary care it 
takes in distinguishing varieties of gross and subtle dissatisfaction. In particular, the 
deeper forms of suffering result from a primal ignorance (avidyā) in which unity and 
enduringness are superimposed upon discrete and momentary phenomena. As a 
result, we experience ourselves, falsely, as enduring subjects interacting with a realm 
of unified objects that we can own, desire and become averse to. Because I 
experience myself as an enduring unified subject opposed to a world of lasting 
objects, I crave (tṛṣṇā) them, or become angry (krodha) when I lose them, become 
jealous (īrṣyā) of their new owner and so on. In juxtaposition to these negative mental 
states, Buddhist virtue theory opposes various positive mental events (kuśala-
dharma) like wisdom (prajñā), love (maitrī), and patience (kṣānti).  These virtuous or 
skillful mental states eliminate suffering, while the negative mental states cause or 
constitute various aspects of pain.   
                                                
13 Śāntideva appeals to fear of negative rebirths frequently, for instance in BCA 4:25.   
14 See Hayes (1996) for a treatment of self-deception in Buddhist texts that overlaps with weakness of 
will. 
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 As a result of ignorance, therefore, the experience of someone progressing on the 
Buddhist path to liberation is shot through with psychological tension in which these 
vicious and virtuous mental states clash. Moreover, these factors are diverse, 
including intellectual, emotional, motivational and attention-focused mental events.15  
Buddhist psychological conflict, then, will take a vast variety of forms.   
Intellectually, the practitioner may understand Buddhist truths like selflessness and 
impermanence, but nevertheless continue to reify phenomena into enduring subjects 
and objects as a result of deeper levels of ignorance. Emotionally, mental defilements 
like anger and craving clash with patience, generosity and love.16  Motivationally 
skillful states like effort (vīrya) contrast with laziness (ālasya).17 Skillful kinds of 
awareness like mindfulness (smṛti) and introspection (saṃprajanya) are opposed by 
distracted forms of attention,18 and concentration (samādhi) can degenerate into a 
weakened form incapable of any deep focus. Likewise, anger and desire can pull us 
away from concentration (samādhi), while effort (vīrya) helps overcome craving 
(tṛṣṇā) and so on.19  
 The plurality of psychological conflict theorized in Buddhist ethical texts suggests 
two contrasts between the form we would expect Buddhist accounts of akrasia to 
take, and Aristotle’s as well as many contemporary accounts. First, Buddhist texts 
will be unlikely to limit themselves to the tension between reason and desire that 
shapes Aristotle and some contemporary accounts. For this reason, the broader 
contemporary understanding of weakness of will as a voluntary response against 
one’s better judgment will provide a closer fit for Buddhist authors than Aristotle’s 
characterization. Second, Buddhist texts see the arising of the negative mental factors 
themselves as causing or even constituting various forms of suffering. Therefore, 
unlike Aristotle and much contemporary work, their focus will not be restricted to 
akratic action. An eruption of anger, a moment of listlessness, a slippage of 
concentration—to the extent that these are voluntary and intellectually recognized as 
inferior responses, all of them may be seen as kinds of weak-willed response by the 
Buddhist ethicist. 
Of course, for ordinary people many of these instances of psychological conflict 
will not be akratic, for they will either be involuntary, or the agent may not judge his 
reaction to be an inferior response. In some cases the practitioner may be unaware of 
a harmful emotion like subtle anger, and in others he will be overcome and literally 
unable to resist a strong emotion. Likewise, he may judge the non-virtuous response 
he is engaging in, such as anger at an unjust situation, to be appropriate. Moreover, I 
                                                
15 Buddhist texts do not use these four categories to group the virtues and vices, but I employ them 
here to help bring out the diversity of psychological tension within Buddhist moral psychology.   
16 Chapter six of Śāntideva’s BCA provides numerous examples of patience characterized as opposed 
to anger. 
17 This is emphasized in chapter seven of Śāntideva’s BCA.   
18 A number of Buddhist psychological manuals give distractedness (asaṃprajanya) as the opposite of 
introspection. Chapter five of Śāntideva’s BCA focuses on preserving mindfulness and introspection.     
19  Śāntideva frequently uses the fear of death and negative rebirths to stimulate effort (vīrya) and 
lessen craving (rāga). See in particular BCA chapter seven. On anger and attachment as obstacles to 
concentration, see Walsh (1995, 349: D ii 314). 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 7.2 (2016)  HARRIS 
33 
have already suggested that Buddhists will be less concerned to distinguish actual 
cases of akrasia from closely related forms of psychological weakness.   
Nevertheless, there are aspects of the Buddhist path that suggest practitioners will 
pass through a stage of moral development in which they alternate between 
succumbing to and resisting akratic response. This is because Buddhists practice 
emphasizes the importance of correct intellectual judgment; for instance, the first 
limb of the eight-fold path is right knowledge, which includes elements of intellectual 
understanding, such as acceptance of the four noble truths and the selflessness and 
impermanence of all phenomena. 20  Further, Buddhists place great emphasis on 
becoming aware of and controlling one’s mental states; in particular, the sixth limb of 
the eightfold path, right effort, is defined as causing positive mental states to arise and 
develop, while preventing and eliminating negative ones. 21  This requires careful 
continual awareness of the mind, which itself is facilitated by skillful mental states of 
awareness like mindfulness (smṛti), which is a lucid state of attention, and 
introspection (saṃprajanya), a background awareness of one’s body and mind.22 As a 
result of these greater levels of attention and awareness, the practitioner develops the 
ability to intervene in previously automatic emotional and perceptual reactions, so 
that harmful physical, verbal and emotional responses can be23 prevented.  
Together, this emphasis on intellectual knowledge of Buddhist tenets, and on the 
development of skillful attention and control over one’s mind, entails that progression 
along the Buddhist path will increasingly result in the factors necessary for potentially 
akratic response. As virtuous and vicious mental states clash, the practitioner will 
retain intellectual knowledge of what represents the better course of action, as well as 
gradually develop the ability to respond virtuously. The possibility of akratically 
choosing the worse option, therefore, represents a provisional achievement along the 
development to full virtue.24   
                                                
20 See for instance Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995, 134: M i 48).   
21 On right effort, see for instance Bodhi (2000, 1529: S v 9). 
22 Both of these mental factors are understood in a variety of ways by both Buddhist and contemporary 
commentators. I base my characterization on Śāntideva’s BCA chap 5, and also borrow Bodhi’s 
description of mindfulness as “lucid awareness” (2011, 25). 
23 This does not necessarily mean that Buddhist psychology need accept a mental factor that plays an 
analogous role to the will in Western thought, as that which deliberates and freely determines action. 
Maria Heim (2014, 25) and Karin Meyers (2010) are convincing in their arguments that at least 
important figures and traditions within Indian Buddhism do not accept any such concept.  
Nevertheless, as Meyers elsewhere argues, Buddhist psychology can distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary action by appealing to a range of mental factors including cetanā (roughly, intention), 
mindfulness (smṛti), introspection (saṃprajanya), attention (manaskāra), desire for action (chanda) 
and discernment (mati) (Meyers 2013, 58-59, but my translations of Sanskrit terms where necessary for 
consistency with the body of this essay.) This is all that is needed to satisfy the voluntary condition of 
the broad characterization of akrasia that I am using in this essay. Heim (2014, 25 and 42, n. 21) and 
Garfield (2010) are right to suggest incompatibility between Buddhist psychology and certain 
conceptions of akrasia, but as I will argue in the following section, there are rich connections to be 
drawn with some work coming out of contemporary treatments of weakness of will in the broader 
sense of voluntary action against one’s better judgment.   
24 Tillemans makes this point on 162. 
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This sketch of the role of akrasia in Buddhist moral development also shows how 
emphasizing its importance is not in tension with other analysis of the structure of 
Buddhist ethics. We have already seen that emphasis on akrasia is compatible with 
understanding Buddhist ethics as a solution to the problem of suffering, since it is 
precisely the deeper forms of suffering that result from, or even constitute the 
psychological tensions of which akratic response is a subspecies.  Further, since it is 
the virtuous and vicious mental states that clash in Buddhist accounts of 
psychological conflict, an analysis of weakness of will is not only compatible with, 
but even requires exploring the role of virtues in Buddhist moral theory.  In the final 
section of this article, I will also argue that the Buddhist understanding of 
psychological weakness overlaps in important ways with an account like Garfield’s 
that stresses the importance of moral perception in Śāntideva’s text. 
 
4. WEAKNESS OF WILL IN ŚĀNTIDEVA’S BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 
 
In the first section of this essay, I emphasized several related differences between 
Buddhist moral psychology and Western treatments of akrasia. First, unlike ancient 
Greek and many contemporary authors, Buddhists reject a strong connection between 
ordinary judgment and motivation, and therefore are unlikely to find akrasia a 
particularly puzzling phenomena. Second, Buddhist authors are more interested in the 
practical question of how psychological conflict can be overcome, rather than the 
theoretical question of how akrasia is possible. Moreover, treatments of akrasia and 
other forms of psychological conflict will often overlap. For these reasons, Buddhist 
authors will have relatively little interest in distinguishing akrasia from closely 
related forms of psychological weakness, such as being overcome by emotion or 
momentarily deceiving oneself into thinking the weak-willed option is the best.   
 This suggests that not only are we unlikely to find extended theoretical treatments 
of akrasia in Buddhist texts, but also that Buddhist authors will often treat various 
forms of psychological weakness together without sharply distinguishing them. This 
is exactly what we find in Śāntideva’s BCA. This does not mean that he does not 
recognize weakness of will and its close cousins as problems, however. One of 
Śāntideva’s most explicit acknowledgements of psychological weakness occurs in the 
fourth chapter. The key term in these verses is “cetanā,” which Wallace and Wallace 
translate as “will”, and to which I will return below. The context is Śāntideva 
bewailing the fact that he continues to perform harmful actions, under the influence of 
negative states of mind (kleśa), even though he knows these will lead to bad karmic 
consequences. 
 
I have somehow obtained the advantageous state that is very 
difficult to achieve, and though aware of that, I am led back 
to those same hells. (BCA 4:26) 
 
I have no will [cetanā] in this matter, as if bewitched by spells. I do 
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not know by whom I am bewitched or who dwells inside me. (BCA 4:27, brackets 
mine)25 
 
 In these verses, Śāntideva comments on his fortune in achieving a human life that 
allows him to practice Buddhist teachings, and bewails the fact that his failure to use 
it appropriately may result in a negative rebirth. The reference to something dwelling 
inside of him is explained in later verses which describe the cognitive and emotional 
defilements (kleśas) of anger, attachment and delusion, the forces that cause 
Śāntideva to act against his commitment to the bodhisattva path. The key phrase in 
the second verse is his claim that his will (cetanā) does not belong to him. Cetanā has 
been variously translated as will, intention, volition, effort and choice, but there isn’t 
any single term that adequately captures its meaning. 26  In Buddhist psychology, 
conscious experience is made up of moments of conscious awareness (citta) and 
various mental factors (caitasika) that provide the affective and cognitive content of 
conscious experience. Cetanā is a mental factor, held to be present in all conscious 
experience, which moves itself, conscious awareness (citta) and the other mental 
factors (caitasika) to the object being experienced. Object, here, refers to anything 
that can be the content of mental awareness.27 
In the second verse quoted above, Śāntideva is complaining that the cetanā that is 
impelling his mind and mental factors does not belong to him. In other words, he has 
committed intellectually to the Buddhist path, and identifies this as the entire purpose 
of his life. As such, he also commits to a host of supporting practices, such as various 
forms of meditation, creating meritorious karma through helpful speech and actions, 
study of Buddhist teachings and so forth.  Instead, influenced by mental defilements, 
cetanā drives his consciousness and mental factors to rest upon harmful objects, such 
as distasteful features of sentient beings that arouse anger, diversions that distract him 
from spiritual practice and so on. Alternately, the object itself may be neutral, as in 
the case of thinking of a friend, but cetanā might move afflictive mental states to the 
object, such as jealousy when I am envious of my friend’s success.   
These verses put us in at least the vicinity of akrasia, since Śāntideva 
intellectually recognizes that he is behaving in ways that harm his purpose in life.  
Moreover, there is a stronger and weaker reading of this verse, both of which I think 
are appropriate here. In the stronger, he finds himself fixated on these objects literally 
against his deliberate control. In the weaker reading, Śāntideva allows his mind to be 
influenced by the afflictive mental states, even though it is within his power to resist 
                                                
25 All translations of the BCA are by Wallace and Wallace (1997). 
26 See Meyers (2010, chap 4) for a careful explication of the meaning of cetanā. I am influenced by her 
analysis in what follows. As Maria Heim argues in her study of Buddhaghosa, we should be careful not 
to identify cetanā with a faculty of will which plays a central role in many Western discussions of 
akrasia (2014, 25). Nevertheless, Śāntideva does here appear to be struggling with the problem of 
voluntarily acting against his better judgment, which is what I mean by “weakness of will” and 
“akrasia” in this essay. In its broadened contemporary sense, weakness of will can occur without a 
faculty of willing, and this allows us to put some contemporary work into conversation with Buddhist 
traditions that may not accept any such faculty.  See also footnote 22 above.   
27 In other words, the intentional object in the phenomenological sense of the term.   
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their sway. The weaker reading would indicate an instance of weakness of will, while 
the stronger would refer to the closely related phenomena of being overcome by 
emotion, since the voluntary element necessary in akratic action is lost.   
 In these verses, then, Śāntideva explicitly recognizes his responses against what 
he intellectually judges to be best as a deep problem to be overcome. In other words, 
he recognizes akrasia, or at least closely related forms of psychological weakness, as 
a practical problem to be solved. Moreover, these verses include no extended 
theoretical discussion over how it is possible for emotion to overpower reason, nor do 
they clarify whether the knowledge that the response is harmful is present at the time 
of the action, or whether the harmful action is done voluntarily. Śāntideva does not, in 
other words, distinguish between akrasia and closely related psychological states like 
self-deception or being overcome by emotion. These verses therefore illustrate two of 
the features I have claimed Buddhist treatments of weakness of will are likely to 
contain: little theoretical curiosity about how akratic action is possible, and little 
concern for carefully distinguishing between akrasia and closely related forms of 
psychological weakness.  
The other feature I claimed we should expect to find in Buddhist treatments of 
weakness of will is that they will consider akrasia and related forms of psychological 
conflict as practical problems to be solved. The treatment Śāntideva’s BCA provides 
for weakness of will is various kinds of meditations through which the positive 
mental factors are strengthened and the negative ones are weakened, leading to 
greater awareness and control over one’s mind. One way to understand the role of 
these meditations is as an invaluable component of Buddhist virtue theory, since they 
develop virtuous and lessen negative mental states. 28  Nevertheless, these virtues 
themselves function to stabilize the mind, bringing it under control and allowing the 
practitioner to respond well to any situation. This suggests that a complementary way 
to understand the role of these meditations is as treating the various kinds of weak-
willed responses that prevent the practitioner from following Buddhist teachings. 
 In the second section of this essay, I argued that Buddhist accounts of 
psychological conflict go beyond Aristotle’s emphasis on the tension between reason 
and desire, to include intellectual, emotional, motivational and concentrative forms of 
tension. Moreover, Buddhist ethicists are as interested in mental responses, like 
emotional reaction, as they are in physical action. Any of these conflicts, then, can 
lead to akrasia in a broadened sense if accompanied by an intellectual awareness that 
how one is responding is not for the best. This suggests that to properly analyze 
Śāntideva’s meditations as treatments for akrasia we will need an expanded 
conception of akratic response that is not limited to physical action. Comparative 
work drawing upon classifications of akratic response developed by contemporary 
philosophers would be useful here; however, most contemporary discussion of 
                                                
28I use “virtue theory” here in Julia Driver’s sense of theorizing the role of the virtues in moral theory.  
I am not claiming Buddhist ethical theory should be classified as a virtue ethics in contrast to 
consequentialisms and deontologies. See Driver (1988, 113 n.1), and Harris (2015, 266-268). 
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weakness of will follow Aristotle in taking action against one’s better judgment as 
their object of analysis.   
 Amélie Rorty’s influential article “Where does the akratic break take place?” 
however provides a significant exception to this trend. Rorty’s article illustrates how 
akratic response can take place at multiple psychological levels; like Śāntideva, she is 
concerned with unskillful mental reactions, even in cases when these reactions may 
not result in a physical action against our better judgment. Below, I apply elements of 
Rorty’s analysis to help bring out the significance of several meditations offered by 
Śāntideva as treatments for akrasia and related forms of psychological conflict. I 
begin each subsection by introducing a relevant form of akratic response as described 
by Rorty, and follow this with an explanation of Śāntideva’s treatment of this 
phenomena, as well as an example of a meditation addressing the akratic break when 
appropriate.  
  1) Akrasia of Direction or Aim.  Rorty characterizes akrasia of aim as a break 
between general beliefs about what is good and the commitment to guide one’s 
actions by these evaluations (Rorty 1980, 335). I might, for instance, acknowledge 
that eating animals is needless and cruel, but refrain from becoming a vegetarian. For 
the Buddhist, akrasia of aim occurs when there is acknowledgement of the Four 
Noble Truths, but no commitment to practice Buddhism. It might also involve 
acknowledgment of the greater value of the bodhisattva path, while maintaining an 
aspiration for individual liberation. For the Buddhist, this occurs because, under the 
influence of mental afflictions like greed (rāga) and hatred (dveṣa), cetanā does not 
move a mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna) and associated mental states (cetasika) 
to the mental representation of a particular Buddhist goal that has been intellectually 
acknowledged as what should be done.   
In the BCA, Śāntideva formally commits to the bodhisattva path in the third 
chapter. If he were to offer a solution for akrasia of aim, we would expect it to come 
before this point. In fact, Śāntideva offers two motivations to undertake the 
bodhisattva path. In the first chapter, he praises its nobility, suggesting the 
bodhisattvas are great men (BCA 1:30) worthy of veneration by gods and humans 
(BCA 1:9). In the second, he reminds us of the horrible suffering that awaits us if we 
do not commit to Buddhist teachings. Below are two sample verses from an extended 
section detailing the trauma of death. 
 
One completely languishes while being led today to have the limbs of  
one’s body amputated.  Parched with Thirst and with pitiable eyes, one  
sees the world differently. (BCA 2:43) 
 
How much more is one overpowered by the horrifying appearances of the messengers of 
Death as one is consumed by the fever of terror and smeared with a mass of excrement?  
(BCA 2:44) 
 
Śāntideva is aware that we have deeply engrained psychological blocks that 
prevent our experiencing the terror of our awaiting death. For this reason, he offers us 
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the image of amputation as a contrast. The image of having a leg or arm cut off as 
punishment for a crime or as treatment for an infection creates a visceral reaction.  
Reading the lines or hearing the words forces us to imagine the act, and we have a 
sense of the terrible suffering of fear and pain that accompany the event.  Śāntideva 
can then point out that the suffering of death will be much greater than this, since not 
just a limb but one’s entire body, as well as friends and possessions, will be lost. We 
should note in the second line the language Śāntideva uses to help us feel some sense 
of the terrible pain resulting from the separation from everything at the time of death.  
One suffers from the fever of terror (jvara-mahātrāsa) which is so great that one 
literally defecates in petrifaction! This will motivate us to take up the Buddhist path 
that intellectually we have already judged to be best. 
  2) Akrasia of Interpretation. According to Rorty, in akratic interpretation one 
interprets a particular situation in a way that conflicts with the principles one has 
adopted (Rorty 1980, 338). Below, I consider three subspecies of akratic 
interpretation identified by Rorty that are relevant to Śāntideva’s text.   
  As will become clear, these kinds of akratic interpretation are closely related, and 
therefore Śāntideva’s treatments of each will largely overlap. Below, I refer to 
passages that seem particularly appropriate to the akratic break in question, but all 
these passages, I think, would have some beneficial impact on treating other forms of 
akratic interpretation.   
  2a) Akrasia of Perception: Akrasia of perception occurs when I interpret and 
categorize what I perceive in a way that conflicts with my principles (Rorty 1980, 
338). For instance, even though I am committed to disabled rights, I might interpret a 
person using a wheelchair as weak.  Rorty gives voluntary shifting between aspects of 
a gestalt, like the painting of two women or a vase, as evidence that we have some 
control over perceptual interpretation (Rorty 1980, 338). For Rorty, to the extent that 
they are voluntary, perceptual interpretations and categorization can be akratic.   
 For a Buddhist monk, viewing a woman’s body as beautiful would conflict with 
his commitment to reducing lust. Śāntideva’s solution to this case of akratic 
perception is to use descriptions calling to mind repulsive images to counteract such 
habitual interpretations.    
 
You fear a skeleton that has been seen like this, even though 
it does not move. Why do you not fear it when it moves as if 
set in motion by some ghost? (BCA 8:48) 
 
If you have no passion for the impure, why do you embrace 
someone else, who is a skeleton of bones tied by sinews and 
smeared with a mire of flesh? (BCA 8:52)  
 
 A monk struggling with sexual impulse can view the woman to whom he is 
attracted as an animated skeleton draped by a flesh covering. The imaginative 
reinterpretation counteracts the monk’s usual perception of the woman’s body as 
beautiful, allowing for it to be seen as repulsive and fearful instead.  Of course, this 
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strategy would only be used provisionally, to counteract lust, and a similar strategy 
could be used by female monastics. 
  2b) Verbal Characterization. In verbal akrasia, we characterize situations in 
ways that conflict with our principles and considered judgments. Rorty gives the 
example of a person committed to nonsexist attitudes characterizing an assertive 
woman’s behavior as “unreasonable” and “demanding,” while calling similar 
behavior in a man “self-respecting” (Rorty 1980, 339).  
Although we can distinguish akrasia of verbal characterization from perceptual 
akrasia, it is closely related, since we ordinarily verbally characterize a situation 
based upon our perceptual interpretation of it. Not surprisingly then, Śāntideva’s 
strategy for dealing with such cases will overlap. His strategy here will be to use 
provocative language that interferes with our habitual characterizations. A female 
body, usually characterized as “beautiful”, for instance, is referred to as “being 
smeared with flesh” (BCA 8:52), “a sack of muck” (BCA 8:53), and “composed of 
filth” (BCA 8:56), as a means of helping the monk avert his lust. 
  A startling feature of Śāntideva’s text is his employment of grim humor in his 
recharacterization of what we usually take to be beautiful. The following pair of 
verses refers to a charnel ground meditation in which the monk imagines the decaying 
corpse of a lover.  
 
Either you have seen that bashfully lowered face before as 
being lifted up with effort, or you have not seen it as it was 
covered by a veil. (BCA 8:44) 
 
 Now, that face is revealed by vultures as if they are unable to 
bear your anxiousness. Look at it! Why are you fleeing away 
now? (BCA 8:45) 
 
 Śāntideva taunts his reader (and perhaps himself), pointing out that since the lover 
longed for and fantasized about the face of the beloved when it was covered by a veil, 
he should be delighted now that the vultures of the charnel ground have removed the 
flesh and laid open the face. The characterizations, disturbing and playful at the same 
time, sharply contrast with the usual romantic characterizations of the woman’s body. 
2c) Emotional Reactions: Rorty suggests that emotional reactions can be akratic 
when they conflict with the person’s judgment of the situation (Rorty 1980, 340). We 
might, for instance, judge that a colleague deserved a promotion more than we did, 
but still feel jealous towards him. Buddhists believe that over time habitual tendencies 
(anuśayas) to experience negative mental states increase, entailing particularly strong 
harmful emotional responses. It is not surprising, then, that Śāntideva spends much of 
the text offering techniques to influence them. For instance, remembering that one has 
vowed to help others achieve the supreme welfare of awakening will dissolve 
jealousy arising as a result of their material prosperity (BCA 6:83), and remembering 
the sufferings that await one in hell as a karmic result of anger acts as an antidote to 
this affliction (BCA 6:89). Much of the text, in fact, can be understood as ways of 
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bringing emotional reactions under conscious control. Progressing through a period in 
which akratic emotional response sometimes occurs will be a necessary transitional 
period in the development of full virtue.    
 One of the most striking sections of Śāntideva’s text is his sixth chapter, dedicated 
to developing patience and averting anger. Below is one of the many meditations he 
offers to dissolve anger towards sentient beings when it begins to arise.  
 
If inflicting harm on others is the nature of the foolish, then 
my anger toward them is as inappropriate as 
it would be toward fire, which has the nature of burning. (BCA 6:39) 
 
If this fault is adventitious and if sentient beings are good by 
nature, then anger toward them is inappropriate 
as it would be toward pungent smoke in the sky.  (BCA 6:40)  
 
 Śāntideva offers these meditations to help avert anger against someone hurting us.  
He points out that if the one harming us is simply depraved, then anger towards them 
is like being angry at a wild animal that cannot control its behavior. If they harm us 
after being overcome by a temporary negative emotion, then once again anger 
towards them is inappropriate since their behavior is only a temporary aberration.    
  3) Akrasia of Character: This is the variety of akrasia that has attracted the most 
philosophical attention, in which one acts against one’s better judgment (Rorty 1980, 
343). Śāntideva, however, gives relatively little attention to physical behavior in his 
text. His emphasis is on perfecting one’s character by developing the virtues of the 
bodhisattva. Once the akratic breaks identified in this section are resolved by these 
virtuous dispositions, then akratic action will cease with little further effort. 
In the prior section, I argued that Buddhist authors will see weakness of will as a 
problem to be solved, and will therefore be likely to both recognize and provide 
treatments for it. In the first part of this section, I argued that Śāntideva explicitly 
recognizes weakness of will, or at least a closely related kind of psychological 
weakness, in the fourth chapter of the BCA. I then examined a series of meditations 
which illustrate Śāntideva’s treatment of various akratic responses. 
  
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Although Garfield is right to emphasize differences between Buddhist moral 
psychology and Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia, this does not conflict with viewing 
weakness of will as an integral element in Śāntideva’s moral thought once we 
broaden our understanding of akrasia to include all voluntary action against one’s 
better judgment. Moreover, like Rorty, if we broaden the akratic responses under 
consideration to include emotional reaction, perceptual classification and so on, it 
becomes easier to draw deep connections with the pluralistic accounts of 
psychological conflict we find in Buddhist texts. Finally, since Buddhist authors are 
unlikely to carefully distinguish akrasia from closely related forms of psychological 
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weakness, cross-cultural work on akrasia will most naturally include consideration of 
closely related phenomena such as self-deception and being overcome by emotion.  
Since both ancient and contemporary authors writing on akrasia already frequently 
discuss these phenomena, this is no reason not to consider their work alongside 
Buddhist authors.   
Another significant difference between Western and Buddhist treatments of 
akrasia is the lack of theoretical puzzlement as to the existence of weakness of will 
within a Buddhist psychological framework, and moreover their greater emphasis on 
seeing psychological weakness as a practical problem to be overcome. Nevertheless, I 
have tried to show how theoretical work on akrasia, in particular Rorty’s 
development of an expanded conception of akratic response, can help articulate the 
implicit recognition by authors like Śāntideva of the existence of multiple akratic 
breaks requiring treatment.   
None of this requires claiming that akrasia is the single key to understanding 
Śāntideva’s BCA, or any Buddhist text. Buddhist ethics frames itself as the solution 
to the problem of suffering, and overcoming weakness of will takes its place 
alongside the development of the virtues, adoption of moral commitments, pursuit of 
the consequence of lessening suffering and so on that largely constitute the activities 
of the Buddhist path. For any particular agent, however, psychological conflict will 
enter into the consistent pursuit, maintenance or development of any of these 
liberating activities. For this reason, weakness of will and its close conceptual cousins 
will resurface continually as the practitioner strives to model his physical, verbal and 
psychological behavior to accord with what he intellectually recognizes as best.  
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